













Sustainability, Debt Management, 


























CARF is presently supported by Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd., Dai-ichi Mutual Life 
Insurance Company, Meiji Yasuda Life Insurance Company, Mizuho Financial Group, Inc., 
Nippon Life Insurance Company, Nomura Holdings, Inc. and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking 

















Working Papers are a series of manuscripts in their draft form.  They are not intended for 
circulation or distribution except as indicated by the author.  For that reason Working Papers may 
not be reproduced or distributed without the written consent of the author. Sustainability, Debt Management, and Public Debt Policy in Japan 
 
 









The purpose of this paper is to analyze sustainability issues of Japan's fiscal 
policy and then to discuss the debt management policy using theoretical models and 
numerical studies. We also investigate the desirable coordination of fiscal and monetary 
authorities toward fiscal reconstruction.     
We include a potential possibilities of the government bonds in our theoretical 
model    The public bonds, therefore, cannot be sold when the issuance leads the amount 
of debt outstanding to be more than a certain level.    In this respect, the fiscal authority 
has to take into account the upper limit of stocks of public debt. 
This possibility of debt default provides the fiscal authority to issue public 
bonds strategically in an earlier period.    A strategic behavior of fiscal authority induces 
the monetary authority, in a later period, to boost output and raise seigniorage 
revenues to eliminate the distortion of resource allocation due to the limitation on debt 
issuance.  Therefore, the monetary policy in a later period suffers from an inflation 
bias from the ax ante point of view.     
There are two ways to eliminate this distortion toward successful fiscal 
reconstruction.  One of them is to make the monetary authority more conservative 
than society in the sense that the price stability weight of monetary authority is higher 
than that of society.  The other way of eliminating the distortion of the resource 
allocation is to design an institutional ceiling on the debt issuance.  The direct ceiling 
can provide a binding constraint of the public bond issuance for the fiscal authority of 
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  1 1.  Introduction 
Currently it is crucial for the Japanese government to implement tight public 
debt policy, because the Japanese government has issued a very huge amount of 
government debts.  Japan’s fiscal situation has deteriorated rapidly with the collapse 
of the ‘bubble economy’ in the early 1990s and the deep and prolonged period of 
economic recession which ensued, and from which recovery has been slow and modest 
despite the implementation of counter-cyclical Keynesian policy.  Since national 
income did not grow much, tax revenue did not increase either.  On the contrary, 
government spending has been gradually raised due to political pressures of interest 
groups, resulting in large budget deficits. 
  In 1997, the Japanese government tried to implement the Fiscal Structural 
Reform so as to reduce budget deficits.  However, in 1998, it stopped the reform and 
reduced taxes and increased public investment based on the traditional Keynesian 
policy because of the severe economic and financial situation, and the defeat of the 
governing party (the Liberal Democratic Party) in the Upper House election.     
  The concern for sustainability of fiscal deficits is a background for the fiscal 
reconstruction and structural reform movement by the current Koizumi Administration.   
The "Structural Reform of the Japanese Economy: Basic Policies for Macroeconomic 
Development" was decided upon after acceptance of the report compiled by the Council 
on Economic and Fiscal Policy, an advisory council to the Prime Minister.  In this 
report the core of policies for the structural reform of the economic society was made 
clear.  In part of the policies shown, a goal to limit the amount of government bond 
issues to less than 30 trillion yen in the fiscal 2002 budget, and afterwards to achieve a 
primary surplus, was set to show that there exists a necessity to take on full-scale 
measures towards fiscal consolidation or fiscal reconstruction.  However, in order to 
cope with the bad situation of macro-economy, 1.8 trillion yen of the advance tax cuts 
was employed with a view to strengthening the competitiveness of industry, facilitating 
a smooth transference of assets to the next generation, promoting a shift from “saving to 
investment”, advancing effective land use, and so on.  The goal to limit the amount of 
government bond issues to less than 30 trillion yen in the fiscal 2002 budget was finally 
abandoned.  In the fiscal 2005, new government bond issues are 34.4 trillion yen and 
the bond dependency ratio rises to 41.8%. 
  If creditors fear that the government is going to be in a debt trap, the long-term 
interest rate begins to rise, reflecting an enlarged credit risk. It is noted that although 
the Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) have been issued too much, their yields are the 
lowest among G7 countries in the bond market. In this regard, despite its weakening 
credit ratings, the 10-year JGB nominal yield of about 1.5% in 2005 remains lower than 
the U.S. bond yield of about 1.8% registered during the Great Depression.  However, 
we also have to pay attention to persistent deflation.  Also, the performance in the 
yield of the JGBs may not accurately reflect its credit risk.  The Japanese banking 
sector continues to purchase the JGBs simply because short-term capital gains from the 
JGBs have been an easy option to offset the existing stock losses. 
  The purpose of this paper is to analyze sustainability issues of Japan's fiscal 
policy and then to discuss the debt management policy using theoretical models and 
numerical studies.  We also investigate the desirable coordination of fiscal and 
monetary authorities toward fiscal reconstruction.   
  This paper consists of five sections.    In section 2 we survey previous studies on 
sustainability issues.  In section 3, we evaluate Japan’s debt management policy by 
providing a theoretical model to analyze public debt policy in a second best case as a 
benchmark.  We then implement a simple numerical analysis based on the smoothing 
rule derived by the theoretical model.  In section 4, we discuss the desirable 
coordination of monetary and fiscal authorities towards fiscal reconstruction by 
  2 explicitly investigating confidence crisis of government debt and spontaneous default of 
fiscal authority. Finally, concluding remarks follow in Section 5. 
 
2.  Sustainability  Issues and Emergency Reform 
2.1 Concerns about sustainability   
  The events of the 1980s and 1990s in Japan suggest that when a government 
becomes strapped for funds, it will tend to borrow from the world credit market rather 
than raise taxes to finance additional public spending. Indeed, many governments did 
either not raise broadly based taxes, e.g., the Thatcher government in Great Britain or 
the Reagan and Bush Administrations in the United States, or simply could not raise 
taxes to prevent causing riots, e.g., countries in Latin American and Eastern Europe, 
and, arguably, France in the reign of Louis XVI. There are long-term concerns about the 
accumulated fiscal deficit.  Important one is whether such a large deficit can be 
sustained.    The system will be paralyzed if public finance collapses under the weight of 
massive deficit.  As a result, the financial system and the economy as a whole will be 
seriously  affected.  An  extreme  case  of  hyperinflation or default could develop. 
  The so-called chain-letter mechanism (or a Ponzi debt game) involves a 
situation where the future time path of taxes is fixed and debt finance is used to pay for 
any additional public spending; debt issuance is thus endogenously determined by the 
government's budget constraint.  If the mechanism is sustainable, increased taxation 
need not necessarily be required in order to finance increased government spending as 
the economy converges to the steady state equilibrium.  If the mechanism is 
unsustainable, the government will eventually go bankrupt in the sense that it will be 
unable to raise enough revenue to finance public spending and debt repayment.  As 
debt crowds out private capital formation, the economy will also eventually go bankrupt 
if the mechanism fails.  This suggests that studying the chain-letter mechanism and 
associated sustainability issues is quite important in terms of understanding the effects 
of government austerity (fiscal reconstruction) measures on the macroeconomy. 
A simple way to evaluate the fiscal sustainability problem is to focus on the 
government bond market.  In this regard for Japan, despite its weakening credit 
ratings, the 10-year Japanese Government Bond (JGB) nominal yield of about 1.5% in 
2005 remains.  So far the myth that the JGBs are risk-free has been somehow 
propagated.    This episode may imply that Japan’s government solvency is not a serious 
issue right now. However, Japan has experienced deep deflation, so the real rate of 
interest is about 2%, which is not so low.  We also have to pay attention to the 
possibility that the performance in the yield of the JGB may not accurately reflect its 
credit risk.     
Ihori, Nakazato, and Kawade (2002) attempt a standard approach to test the 
fiscal sustainability condition, using the methodology of Hamilton and Flavin (1986).  
They conduct the empirical analysis for the Japanese fiscal data from 1957 to 1999.    To 
conduct the test, the values for the nominal growth rate, n, and the nominal interest 
rate, r, must be specified.  Their strategy is to set various values for r – n and to check 
whether the results are sensitive to the values chosen.  The estimated results imply 
that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at a 5% significance level, suggesting that 
government solvency was not a serious problem until fiscal 1996.    On the contrary, the 
result for the period 1957-1997 rejects the null hypothesis when r – n is above 0.05, and 
the results for the period 1957-1998 and the period 1957-1999 also reject the null 
hypothesis when r – n is above 0.04.     
Bohn (1998) proposes a new method different from existing tests for 
sustainability of government debt.  According to Bohn (1998), the test has better 
properties than the tests based on estimating a transversality condition and on 
cointegration tests.  The condition that fiscal policy satisfies the intertemporal budget 
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surplus to GDP (st) increases with the ratio of (start-of-period) debt to GDP (dt).1  
Strictly speaking, when we can express a relation between the two as 
  st = f(dt) + μt
Suppose other determinants, μt, is bounded and the present value of future GDP is 
finite.  Then, government debt satisfies a transversality condition if there is a 
debt-GDP ratio d* such that f'(dt) ≥β > 0 for all dt ≥d*, where β is a positive constant.    We 
draw a scatter plot of st against dt in Figure 1 (only the general account of the central 
government) and Figure 2 (the consolidated account of the central and local 
governments).  Until the early 1990s, the Japanese fiscal policy held the quadratic 
relation between the two.  Recently, the Japanese fiscal policy deviates from the 
relation excessively. Doi and Ihori (2003) show that Japanese government debt does not 
satisfy a transversality condition for fiscal 1965-2000 by estimating β.   
 
**** Insert Figure 1 **** 
**** Insert Figure 2 **** 
 
  These observations indicate that fiscal sustainability may become a serious 
issue.  The longer the sample period, the more likely we face the fiscal crisis.  It 
follows that the chain letter mechanism will cause the public debt crisis to occur in the 
near future. Japan has two serious difficulties in terms of sustainability.  First, the 
Japanese primary surplus is apparently a decreasing function of the debt-GDP ratio 
since 1990 and hence it does not satisfy Bohn’s test.  Second, the rate of interest is 
greater than the growth rate in Japan in the 1990s.  Hence, it is important to reduce 
the government deficit in the near future. 
 
2.2. Emergency Reform 
  Many governments prefer to rely on the issuance of debt rather than explicit 
taxation in financing expenditures.  Recent experience suggests that a number of 
countries are facing potential bankruptcy as a result of issuing too much debt.  As 
shown in Ihori (1988), the chain-letter mechanism would most likely be sustainable 
when the initial interest rate and stock of government debt are smaller or when the 
propensity to save and the growth rate are higher. 
  When the government goes eventually bankrupt, austerity measures as fiscal 
reconstruction will be required. This will depend critically on the response of the private 
sector to the specific austerity policy and more specifically the response of capital 
accumulation. Serious mistakes, which will possibly exacerbate the bankruptcy problem, 
may occur if the wrong action is taken. The conventional wisdom suggests that either 
the government must raise taxes or dramatically reduce spending.  This is contingent 
on an increase in capital accumulation taking place in response to the change in policy. 
However, whether these contractions will be affected through cuts in spending or 
increases in explicit tax collections, and when these actions will be taken is in general 
unknown. Expectations of future policy changes are crucial in understanding seemingly 
counterintuitive macroeconomic dynamics.  Bertola and Drazen (1993) argue that 
expectations about the discrete character of future fiscal adjustments can help explain 
the effects of current fiscal policy.  They showed that if government spending follows 
an upward-trending stochastic process which the public believes may fall sharply when 
it reaches specific 'trigger' points, then optimizing consumption behavior and simple 
budget-constraint arithmetic imply a nonlinear relationship between private 
consumption and government spending.  This theoretical relation is consistent with 
the experience of several countries. 
  Such a situation might be relevant for the recent Japanese economy.    A recent 
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bond-financed deficits carry with them future tax obligations. Anticipating higher 
future taxes, private agents change current spending behavior to smooth consumption 
intertemporally.  Although the econometric study of this issue is still in its infancy, 
some recent research indicates that private Japanese behavior has partially offset 
recent changes in fiscal policy (see Ihori and Sato (2002) among others). 
In reality, however, it may be difficult to employ the standard austerity 
measures in a proper time.  For example, Japan's fiscal policy in the 1990s created a 
problem of a tendency to postpone fiscal reconstruction reforms.   The consensus at the 
time was that there was no immediate need for such painful measures as long as 
government policy prevented the economy from slipping into recession. There was, 
indeed, a widespread feeling in the private sector that the government would come to its 
aid if the economic situation worsened.  That feeling fostered certain complacency in 
the business world, making many corporate managers liable to “moral hazards” – risks 
stemming from lack of self-discipline. The continuation of the short-term stimulus 
policy, at a time when the economy needed long-term structural changes, discouraged 
self-help efforts in the private sector.  Lobbying activities of local interest groups was 
exaggerated in the 1990s, as showed in Ihori, Doi and Kondo (2001) and Doi and Ihori 
(2002)’s empirical evidence. This is also one of the main reasons why Japan's fiscal 
reconstruction did not perform very well in the 1990s. 
It is thus argued that if the current deficits seem not sustainable, governments 
in such countries will be forced to in effect repudiate their debt, either explicitly through 
an introduction of partial default or through inflation depreciation (inflationary taxes). 
We may call such a policy change the emergency reform for debt repudiation.  The 
consequent fiscal reconstruction postponement is not free from credibility problems:  
Will the additional debt be paid off in full, or will the government find it optimal to 
resort to higher inflation or partial default to diminish the burden of the debt, etc?  It 
should be stressed that if the private sector recognizes such possibilities of future 
emergency reforms for debt repudiation, government bonds and real capital may no 
longer be regarded as perfect substitutes.  The more likely the current deficits seem 
not sustainable, the higher the subjective probability of the future emergency reform.     
  Several important papers investigated debt Ponzi games under uncertainty.  
The average riskless rate may be a poor guide as to whether permanent rollover of debt 
is feasible when economies are stochastic. Blanchard and Weil (1992) show that 
whether or not governments can rollover debt in dynamically efficient economies 
depends on whether the issuance of public debt can partially substitute missing 
markets.  Bohn (1991) shows that the sustainability even of simple policy rules like 
balanced budgets or tax rate smoothing should not be taken for granted in a stochastic 
economy and that sustainability is often sensitive to assumptions about debt 
management.  The sustainability question in stochastic models is an aspect of fiscal 
policy that deserves more attention in future research and in policy-making. 
 
2.3 Remarks 
  Tirole (1985) and Weil (1987a) examine in the overlapping generations 
framework deterministic and speculative bubbles which are, like government debt, 
intergenerational schemes based on trust.    Weil considered a two-state model with real 
capital and a bubble.  The main result in Weil is that the highest sustainable bubble 
(the equivalent of the highest sustainable debt in the present paper) decreases with the 
probability of bursting (debt repudiation). 
  Economic theory has begun to catch up with political reality. It has done this 
by not only studying the optimality of fiscal policy in a context where explicit account is 
taken of the government's budget constraint but it has gone a step further by examining 
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keep promises that were optimal to make in the past.    The latter lies at the heart of the 
credibility dilemma faced by any serious politician. Calvo (1988) studies models in 
which debt repudiation is possible and showed that expectations may play a crucial role 
in the determination of equilibrium.    See also Chari and Kehoe (1993), and Bulow and 
Rogoff (1989). 
The fiscal regime prevailing in an economy, as well as the type of fiscal 
relationships expected to arise from such a regime, is an important factor in 
determining the response of private agents to fiscal signals.  Fiscal regimes differ 
across countries and change over time.  At each point in time there is uncertainty 
about the regime that will prevail from then on.    A high government deficit financed by 
debt can be regarded as unsustainable and therefore may be taken to signal future 
contractions in the deficits.    Alesina, Prati and Tabellini (1990) show that the maturity 
structure of public debt may influence the likelihood of a confidence crisis on the debt.  
The shorter and more concentrated is the maturity, the more likely is a confidence crisis.   
See also Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). 
 
3. Debt Management Policy of the Japanese Government 
3.1 Japan's Government Bonds 
  The Japanese government currently issues government bonds, which can be 
classified into six categories: short-term (6-month and 1-year Treasury bills); 
medium-term (2-year and 5-year bonds); long-term (10-year bonds); super-long-term 
(15-year, 20-year and 30-year bonds); government bonds for individual investors; and 
inflation-indexed bonds.  The short-term government bonds are all discount bonds.  
On the other hand, all medium-, long-, and super-long-term government bonds, except 
for the 15-year floating-rate bonds, are the bonds with fixed-rate coupons.    The 15-year 
floating-rate bonds and the government bonds for individual investors feature a coupon 
rate that varies according to certain rules.  The inflation-indexed bonds are issued as 
the 10-years bonds to finance funds for the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program.2
  The planned issue amount of each JGB for fiscal 2004 is shown in Table 1.    In 
the past, there used to be some other types of government bonds.    But after the August 
1988 3-year fixed-rate bonds, the September 2000 5-year discount bonds, the February 
2001 4-year fixed-rate bonds, the March 2001 6-year fixed-rate bonds, and the 
November 2002 3-year discount bonds, these bonds have never been issued.  The 
current maturity structure of the government bonds (outstanding basis) is shown in 
Figure 3. 
 
**** Insert Table 1 **** 
**** Insert Figure 3 **** 
 
3.2 Theoretical Analysis of Debt Management Policy 
  We construct a theoretical model based on Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997a, 
1997b).  We include a potential possibilities of the government bonds in the model in 
Section 4. There are households, firms, the fiscal authority (government) and the 
monetary authority (central bank).  The households live for two periods.  The firms 
produce a private good by using labor, at given price level, Pt ( t = 1, 2).  Their 
production functions are Yt = Lt
η  ( 0   <   η < 1), where Yt denotes output, Lt denotes input of 
labor.  Their profits are described as (1–τt)PtLt
η–WtLt, where Wt denotes nominal wage 
rate, The firms’ output is taxed at a rate τt, as will be described later. 
  The households organize labor unions, the objective of which is to obtain a 
target real wage rate.    They are assumed to make an expectation to inflation rationally.   
We also assume that the unions have monopoly power in the labor market.  We can 
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wage rate is set equal to the (rationally) expected price level.   
  Under such a situation, the logarithm of output yt ≡ lnYt is written as 




t – τt + lnη). 





t denotes the inflation rate expected by the private sector.  Since 
η
1–ηlnη is a constant, we set v ≡ 
η
1–η  , and normalize yt as follows 
  x ≡ y – v lnη = v(π – π t t t t t
Equation (1) is the Lucas supply function.     
e – τ)      (1) 
  In a rational expectations equilibrium (πt = π
e
t), if there exist no tax distortion 
(τt = 0), the normalized output is given as xt = 0.  This normalized output level 
corresponds to the natural rate of employment, as mentioned in Fujiki et al. (1998).  
Moreover, the socially desirable output,  , without any distortion of resource 
allocation is positive, because the socially desirable employment is allowed to exceed the 
natural rate of employment, as pointed out in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997a, 1997b).  
Hereafter    is assumed to be given as a positive constant exogenously.   
~ xt
~ xt
  Next, we describe behavior of the monetary authority.  The monetary 
authority decides level of money supply in each period.    We presume that the quantity 




 =  κ   ~ Xt
where κ is a constant, Mt denotes nominal money supply, and  ≡ exp( ).  Since   
is given exogenously, the monetary authority determines the inflation rate directly 
through controlling money supply. Therefore, 
Mt–Mt–1
Mt
~ Xt ~ xt
~ Xt
 =  πt in this model.     
  Finally, we consider the government’s behavior.  The government (or fiscal 
authority) collects revenues from taxes, bond issuing and seigniorage.    Its revenues are 
used for fiscal expenditures and repayment of government bond. The government can 
issue (inflation-indexed) bonds.  We assume that the government can issue only 
one-period bond and the pure expectation hypothesis of interest rate is  held.  In  such  a 
situation, the fiscal authority faces the following budget constraint in each period; 
  P1G1 + (1+rB1)P1B0 = τ1P1X1 + (M1–M0) + P1B1
  P2G2 + (1+rB2)P2B1 = τ2P2X2 + (M2–M1) 
where Gt denotes real government expenditures, rBt denotes interest rate of bonds in 
period t, and Bt denotes the outstanding bonds at the end of period t.  B0, outstanding 
bond at the end of period 0, is exogenously given for the government.    The government 
chooses Gt, τt, BBt.   
  Dividing both sides of the above budget constraints by Pt
~ Xt   gives the following 
budget constraints in share of non-distortionary (normalized) output: 
  g1 + (1+rB1)b0 = τ1 + κπ1 + b1     (2-1) 





,.    We presume that Xt ≈ ≈ ~ Xt
~ X (a constant). 
  For simplicity, the real interest rate is assumed to be equal to the world 
interest rate ρ, which is constant over time.  Hence rBt = ρ. From (2-1,2) we can obtain 
the integrated government budget constraint as follows, 

















g      (3) 
 
3.3  Second  Best  Solution 
  In this subsection, we analyze the most desirable case with distortionary taxes, 
where the two policy makers are integrated and are committed to their policy 
announcements.  We deal with the situation in which the government and the central 
bank are integrated and are credibly committed to their policy announcements.  The 
credible commitment particularly implies that the policy makers announce an inflation 
rate and commit themselves to the announced rate at the beginning of each period 
before nominal wages are concluded. 
  The society has the social loss function V









2 + (xt –~ x )
2 + αgS(gt – )
2]    (4)  ~ gt
where απS > 0, αgS > 0, and βS denotes the discount factor, 0< βS ≤ 1.  We define  t g ~  as 
the government spending target as the optimal share of the output realized without tax 
distortions or inflation surprises in period t.    Now, for simplicity of the analysis,  t g ~  is 
assumed to be constant over time:  g gt
~ ~ = . 
  The policy makers minimize the above loss function.  The constraints of each 
period consist of the Lucas supply function (1), the government budget constraint (3), 
and the restriction generated by the rational expectations formation of the private 
sector (π
e





) = αgS(g ~ –gt) = 
απS
κ πt  (t=1,  2)     (5-1) 




 =  βS(1+ρ)(τ2+
~ x
v
)       (5-3) 
  g ~ –g1 = βS(1+ρ)(g ~ –g2)       (5-4) 
Equation (5-1) is the static optimization condition in each period.    Equations (5-2), (5-3) 
and (5-4) are the intertemporal optimization conditions for inflation, tax rate, and 
government spending, respectively.  For example, if βS(1+ρ) = 1 (the discount rate is 
equal to the rate of interest), it is desirable to have the same levels of inflation, tax rate, 
and government spending over time, respectively.  This is a well known smoothing 
condition over time a la Barro (1979).    See also Barro (1995, 2003).   
  Several remarks are useful.  Firstly, as Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997a, 
1997b) mention, the social loss is affected by the initial level of government debt 
outstanding.  In  the  equilibrium, optimal value of V
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from (4) and (5).    It means that the larger the initial debt b0 the larger is the social loss.   
Secondly, the income tax and individual preferences of leisure and labor affect 
the production level of the nation.     
Intuition is as follows.  To maintain the neutrality of bonds toward social 
welfare (social loss), it is necessary to issue bonds to cover the part of fiscal expenditures 
and redemption that cannot be covered from tax revenues and re-coinage profits while 
maintaining budget constraints and not distorting the inflation rate, tax rate, and fiscal 
expenditures.    Issuing bonds should act as a buffer in the budget. 
  8   These results are the same as Beetma and Bovenberg (1997a). 
 
3.4. Numerical Analysis 
  In this subsection, we numerically examine the second best debt management 
policy under commitment, which is theoretically analyzed in the previous subsection.  
We can easily extend the analytical framework to a more general multi-period model.  
For the present numerical analysis, we use a 200-period model and incorporate nominal 
bonds as well.4
  In doing the numerical analysis, it is necessary to specify values of some 
exogenous parameters in the theoretical model.  Based on the data of Japanese 
economy, we set η = 0.7, ρ =0.04, βS =0.964, απS = 2, αgS = 3,  ~ x = 0.01, and  g ~ =  0.1.  We 
also adapt κ = 0.36, as mentioned in Fujiki et al. (1998).     
  We set the initial outstanding debt to (normalized) output ratio as 100%.  
Under such values of parameters, we derive numerical results by expanding the model 
to 200 periods.  Figure 4 shows transitions of government debt outstanding (to the 
desirable output ratio) in the upper figure, and inflation rate (π), government 
expenditure (to the desirable output ratio: g), and tax rate (τ) in the lower figure.  The 
upper figure suggests that it is desirable to reduce the bond dependence ratio gradually 
to redeem fully in the 200th period.    The lower figure indicates the smoothing effects of 
these flow variables a la Barro (1979).    These figures reflect the smoothing effect. 
 
**** Insert Figure 4 **** 
 
 
4. Debt Management and Fiscal Sustainability 
4.1 Default of the government bonds 
  As analyzed in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997a, b) among others, when 
monetary and fiscal authorities are not cooperative and not able to commit their policy 
announcements, an optimally designed conservative, independent central bank is 
necessary to establish the second best.  The central bank must be made more 
conservative than society. They showed that correcting monetary policy preferences is a 
direct way to eliminate the distortions due to the inability to commit. Drudi and 
Giordano (2000) showed that since default risk increases as the maturity structure of 
the debt shortens, optimal maturity under bankruptcy risk is in general longer than in 
the case in which debt repudiation policies can be precommitted or are very much 
unlikely.  See  also  Persson,  Persson and Svensson (1987, 2005). 
  If we allow for political distortions, the preferences of the fiscal authority may 
depart from the preferences of society. In the presence of political distortions a debt 
target is also needed.    For example, if the government discounts the future too heavily, 
the optimal debt target would de facto act as a ceiling on public debt. 
  In Japan, the central bank now acts as an independent policy maker and its 
concern on inflationary targeting is more conservative than the government.  In this 
sense, we could say that the central bank behaves in a good manner to attain the second 
best.   
  Let us explain this by including confidence crisis of government debt and 
spontaneous default of fiscal authority in the model introduced in Section 3.       
Investors of government bonds decide whether they buy bonds or not in prospect of 
behaviors of the government.  If they can perfectly expect the government’s default, 
they do not purchase bonds at all.    Hence we should investigate such a situation using 
backward induction.  It means that a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is adopted as 
a solution concept in this section. 
The fiscal authority and the monetary authority have individual loss functions.   
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where απF > 0, αgS > 0, and βS denotes the discount factor, 0< βS ≤ 1.    Also Loss function 
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2]     (7) 
where απM > απF > 0.  It implies that the monetary authority is more conservative in 
inflation than the fiscal authority.  Each policy maker minimizes the above loss 
function, taking policies selected by the other authority as given.  In this section, we 
set that both policymakers decide policies simultaneously in each period.  Investors of 
the government bonds have the loss function (4). 
Now, we describe a situation that the government triggers a debt default.    The 
government can declare the default before policies are chosen in this period.    When the 
default occurs, the government does not pay at all.5  However, the production in this 
economy is deteriorated due to the default.    In this situation, the Lucas supply function 
is assumed to include default costs. 
  xt = zv(πt – π
e
t – τt)   0  <  z <1      ( 1 ’ )  
where  z is constant over time. It means that the production in default on the 
government bond is z times as large as that in the normal situation, regardless of the 
amount of the debt. 
The constraints of each period consist of the Lucas supply function (1) or (1’), 
the government budget constraints (2).  We also rewrite the government budget 
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2 from equation (1’), z =1 in the 
normal situation, and 0 < z < 1 in default of payment. 
  We assume that, in each period, the monetary authority cannot commit the 
inflation rate announced at the beginning of each period before nominal wages are set.  
Under this situation, the policy authorities take inflation expectations as 
predetermined.    Such situation is represented in Figure 5 as a game tree. 
 
**** Insert Figure 5 **** 
 
 
4.2 Policy choice in the second period 
  To solve for the two-period decision problem, we use the backward induction 
method.  Thus, we begin with solving for the solution in the second period and then 
proceed to solve for the solution in the first period.  It implies that such a policy is a 
time-consistent policy, which is analyzed in Lucas and Stokey (1983), Persson, Persson 
and Svensson (1987, 2005), Calvo and Guidotti (1990a, 1990b) and so on.    In the second 
period, the fiscal authority chooses {τ2, g2} to minimize its loss function, subject to the 
budget constraint (8-2).  Also the monetary authority chooses {π2} to minimize its loss 
function, taking as given the expected inflation rate (π
e
2), without any regard for the 
budget constraint (8-2).     
  10  
4.2.1  The  normal  case 
  If the government does not trigger a debt default in the second period, we 
obtain the following conditions from the first order conditions for the choice of {π2, τ2, g2}, 
taking policies decided by the other authority and inflation expectation and b1 as given, 
  v(x ~ – x2) = αgS(g ~ – g2) = απMπ2      (9) 
Moreover, from the above conditions and the government budget constraint and the 
restriction generated by the rational expectations formation of the private sector (π
e
2 = 
π2), the following relations are held 
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4.2.2    The case of default 
  If the government does declare a debt default in the second period, the 
government may decrease its value of the loss function.    Then, investors would not buy 
the government bond in the first period if they can predict the debt default in the second 
period.  In this situation, the government cannot issue the bonds in the first period, 
and does not have any bonds to default in the second period.  Therefore, the 
government cannot trigger a default in the second period. 
 
4.3    Policy choice in the first period 
  In the first period, investors of the government bonds firstly expect whether 
the government trigger a debt default.6  If they believe the default occurs, they do not 
buy the bonds at all.  This situation is confidence crisis.  Under this situation, the 
government cannot newly issue bonds (b1).  If investors expect the default does not 
occur, the government bonds are freely traded. 
  After that, the fiscal authority chooses {τ1, g1, b1} to minimize its loss function, 
subject to the budget constraint (8-1).  Also the monetary authority chooses {π1} to 
minimize its loss function, without any regard for the budget constraint (8-1).     
 
4.3.1  The  normal  case  under  no confidence crisis (Case N) 
  First, we consider a situation that confidence crisis does not occur.    Under this 
situation, the government can newly issue an one-period bond (b1).  The fiscal and 
monetary authorities minimize their loss functions in consideration of situation in the 






2 + (x1 –x ~ )
2 + αgS(g1 –g ~ )
2] + βSV2
a     (12) 
where a = F, M.  V2
a denotes the value of loss function in the second period.  V2
F is 
defined as (11), and V2
M is obtained by assigning (10) to (7). 
  11   The monetary authority minimizes (12) regardless of the government budget 
constraint, taking policies selected by the fiscal authority and inflation expectation and 
b0 as given.    From the first order condition for the choice of {π1}, we obtain the following 
condition 
  v(x ~ – x1) = απMπ1        ( 1 3 - 1 )  
  The fiscal authority minimizes its loss function.   
  v(x ~ – x1) = αgS(g ~ –g1) = βN
*[K
~
+ (1+ρ)b1]     (13-2) 
where  βN
*  ≡  βS(1+ρ)NF
*/N.  From the above conditions (13-1,2) and the government 
budget constraint, the following relations are held under the rational expectations 
formation of the private sector (π
e
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4.3.2    The case of default under confidence crisis (Case D) 
  Next, we consider a situation that confidence crisis occurs.  Under this 
situation, the government cannot newly issue any bond (b1 = 0), and trigger a debt 
default in the first period. 
  The fiscal and monetary authorities minimize their loss functions.    If once the 
government defaults on payments in the first period, however, the government has no 
debt in the second period, that is, there is no default in the second period.  Thus the 





2 + (x1 –x ~ )
2 + αgS(g1 –g ~ )
2] + βS 0 2 1 | = b
a V      (12’) 
where a = F, M, and  : V 0 2 1 | = b
a V 2
a with b1 = 0. 
Also the production in this situation is determined by (1’).  The government 
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) + κπ1 + (g ~ –g1)   0  <  z <1   (8-1’) 
  The monetary authority minimizes (12’) regardless of the government budget 
constraint, taking policies selected by the fiscal authority and inflation expectation as 
given.  From the first order condition for the choice of {π1}, we obtain the following 
condition 
  vz(x ~ – x1) = απMπ1        ( 1 6 - 1 )  
  The fiscal authority minimizes its loss function (12’), subject to (8-2). The 
authority sets policies to satisfy the following condition: 
  vz(x ~ – x1) = αgS(g ~ – g1)       (16-2) 
  12   From the above conditions (1’), (16-1, 2), and the government budget constraint 
(8-1’), the following relations are held under the rational expectations formation of the 
private sector (π
e
1 = π1) 
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4.3.3    Welfare comparison between Case N and Case D 
  Whether the confidence crisis occurs or not in the first period depends on 
welfare loss of the fiscal authority in each case.  If the government defaults on 
payments, investors of the government bonds face losses.  Thus, they do not buy the 
bonds at all when they expect that the government trigger a debt default in the first 
period. 
 If  V1
FN ≤ V1
FD, the fiscal authority does not have any incentives to default in the 
first period.  Hence, investors can purchase the government bonds.  We further 
analyze this situation. 
  V1
FN ≤ V1
FD is satisfied under the following conditions 




































FD, that is, condition (19) is held, investors buy the government bonds in 
the first period.  It means that there is no confidence crisis in the first period under 
this situation.  Otherwise, investors do not buy bonds at all in the first period.  Thus 
confidence crisis occurs in the first period. 
 
4.4 Numerical Analysis 
  In this subsection, we also numerically examine the above situation, which is 
theoretically analyzed in the previous subsection.  We can easily extend the analytical 
framework to a more general T-period model.    We will describe the detail setting of this 
numerical analysis in Appendix at the end of this paper.     
  In this numerical analysis we introduce the maturity structure of the 
government bonds to make it more realistic.  We adopt this structure in fiscal 2003 in 
Japan.    The maturity structure of the outstanding debt is assumed to be given in Table 
2.    These ratios mean composition ratios to total amount of debt by remaining years to 
maturity.  For example, the ratio of the government bonds which has the remaining 
year to maturity less than 1 year is about 36%.     
 
**** Insert Table 2 **** 
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  We also calculate the transition of policy variables in the realistic case 
described the above sections.  As we mentioned, in the realistic case, the government 
may trigger a debt default.    Thus can the fiscal authority avoid a default?    Or does the 
authority have an incentive to default?   We consider whether the government defaults 
on payment under our calibration setting. 
  We set the value of parameters used in this model as the same in the second 
best case in Section 3.4.    Also we set z = 0.9. 
  In the numerical analysis, we calculate the value of loss function of the fiscal 
authority in case of default (Vt
FD) and the value of loss function in case of no-default 
(Vt
FN) in each period, and then compare both values.  If Vt
FD ≥ Vt
FN, the government in 
period t does not default.    If Vt t
  In conclusion, under our setting in the 200-period model, we find that the fiscal 
authority could still avoid a default, fortunately.  First, the upper figure of Figure 6 
shows the transition of outstanding debts.    In this case, the fiscal authority takes such 
a policy that the outstanding of government bond increases first and it decreases 
sharply in the near the last period.    This phenomenon seems to reflect the fact that the 
fiscal authority issues government bonds strategically.  And it suggests that the 
outstanding debt in this situation does not exceed about 120%.    It is consistent with no 
default. 
FN > V
FD, the government triggers a default. 
  The lower figure of Figure 6 shows inflation rate (π), government expenditure 
(to the desirable output ratio: g), and tax rate (τ).    When the outstanding of government 
bonds is large, the issuance of new bonds results in the debt default.  Therefore, the 
large amount of outstanding debt limits the fiscal authority to issue a new government 
bonds.  As a result, issuance of government bonds leads the fiscal authority to an 
advantageous position against the monetary authority.    In other words, the issuance of 
bonds works as a credible threat to the monetary authority.    This mechanism leads the 
inflation rate to be higher, comparing to the second best case.  Inflation rate becomes 
over 6%.    In contrast, the tax rate is kept low about 3%. 
 
**** Insert Figure 6 **** 
 
4.5    Intuitions of the analysis and policy implications 
  According to conditions (19), the fiscal authority has an incentive to default 
when the amount of debt outstanding is more than a certain level. Expecting the debt 
default, the investors do not buy the public bonds at all.  The public bonds, therefore, 
cannot be sold when the issuance leads the amount of debt outstanding to be more than 
the certain level.  In this respect, the fiscal authority has to take into account the 
upper limit of stocks of public debt. 
  This possibility of debt default provides the fiscal authority to issue public 
bonds strategically in the first period.    Suppose that fiscal authority, in the first period, 
issues public bonds to be paid in subsequent periods in a multi-period setting.  The 
amount of issuance is, in addition, supposed to set to the extent that fiscal authority has 
to raise tax rate to finance the government spending and/or cut the government 
spending itself in the second period because the additional debt issuance is limited due 
to the possibility of the default in subsequent periods. 
  This strategic behavior of fiscal authority induces the monetary authority, in a 
later period, to boost output and raise seigniorage revenues to eliminate the distortion 
of resource allocation due to the limitation on debt issuance.  Therefore, the monetary 
policy in a later period suffers from an inflation bias from the ax ante point of view.  
Expecting such future monetary policy, the fiscal authority has an incentive to issue 
more public bonds strategically in an earlier period because it will lead the fiscal 
  14 authority to the advantageous position in the game played in a later period.  This 
strategic bias of the fiscal authority results in the distortion of the resource allocation.7
  There are two ways to eliminate this distortion toward successful fiscal 
reconstruction.  One of them is to make the monetary authority more conservative 
than society in the sense that the price stability weight of monetary authority is higher 
than that of society.  If the monetary authority is conservative enough not to raise 
inflation depending passively on the strategic accumulation of public bonds, the fiscal 
authority does not engage in the strategic accumulation of debt in an earlier period.  
Consequently the central bank should be more conservative to eliminate the distortion 
due to the strategic behavior of fiscal authority. 
The other way of eliminating the distortion of the resource allocation is to 
design an institutional ceiling on the debt issuance.  This institutional framework 
eliminates directly the distortion stemmed from the strategic behavior of the fiscal 
authority.  Needless to say, this direct ceiling does not work effectively if the fiscal 
authority has not issued public bonds to the extent that the amount of debt outstanding 
is close to the critical level of debt default.    It is therefore natural that the direct ceiling 
might not be necessary for many countries, but it can provide a binding constraint of the 
public bond issuance for the fiscal authority of Japan because it has accumulated the 




If the expansionary trend in Japan's government spending continues at this 
pace, the fiscal deficit will inflate further and the ability to raise taxes in the future will 
be politically limited. Investors will lose confidence in Japan’s public bonds if they 
believe that the nation’s public finance is bound for long-term crisis. The result is that 
interest rates will rise and fiscal failure will become a more tangible reality. 
This paper has analyzed sustainability issues of Japan's fiscal policy and then 
discussed the debt management policy using theoretical models and numerical studies. 
We also investigated the desirable coordination of fiscal and monetary authorities 
toward fiscal reconstruction.     
We have also investigated confidence crisis of government debt and 
spontaneous default of fiscal authority.    The fiscal authority has an incentive to default 
when the amount of debt outstanding is more than a certain level.  Expecting  the  debt 
default, the investors do not buy the public bonds at all.  The public bonds, therefore, 
cannot be sold when the issuance leads the amount of debt outstanding to be more than 
the certain level.  In this respect, the fiscal authority has to take into account the 
upper limit of stocks of public debt. Our numerical study suggests that the fiscal 
authority could still avoid a default in Japan. 
We have also showed that for a country with large stocks of public debt like 
Japan, the fiscal authority has an incentive to issue public bonds strategically. This 
strategic bias distorts the monetary authority to increase inflation too much. To 
eliminate this distortion bias and to attain fiscal reconstruction, an institutional ceiling 
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  17 Appendix    Numerical analysis in a realistic case 
 
  In Section 4.4, we also numerically examine a realistic case, which is 
theoretically analyzed in Sections 4.1-4.3.  We can easily extend the analytical 
framework to a more general T-period model.    Now we introduce maturity structure of 
the government bond.    The government can issue (inflation-indexed) bonds, and choose 
their maturity.    The pure expectation hypothesis of interest rates is assumed to be held.   
In such a situation, the fiscal authority faces the following budget constraint in period t; 
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where BBst denotes the amount of bonds issued in period s with a prescribed payout in 
period t and bst ≡ 
Bst ~ X
.  Note z = 1 in the normal situation, and 0 < z < 1 in default of 
payment.  The initial maturity structure of the government bond {B0v|  v  ≥ 1} is 
exogenously given for the government in each period.  The government in period t 
chooses gt, τt, btv (t+1≤ v ≤ T).   
 
 
A.1    The normal case in the final period 
  If the government does not trigger a debt default in the final period (period T), 
we obtain the following conditions from the first order conditions for the choice of {πT, τT, 
gT}, taking policies decided by the other authority and inflation expectation as given, 
  v(x ~ – xT) = αgS( g ~ – gT) = απMπT
Moreover, from the above conditions and the government budget constraint and the 
restriction generated by the rational expectations formation of the private sector (π
e
T = 
πT), the following relations are held 
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A.2    Policy choice in period T– 1 
  In period T– 1, investors of the government bonds firstly expect whether the 
government trigger a debt default (in period T– 1 or the period T).  If they believe the 
default occurs, they do not buy the bonds at all.  This situation is confidence crisis.  
Under this situation, the government cannot newly issue bonds (bT–1,T).  If investors 
expect the default does not occur, the government bonds are freely treaded. 
  After that, the fiscal authority chooses {τT–1, gT–1, bT–1,T} to minimize its loss 
function, subject to the budget constraint (A-1).  Also the monetary authority chooses 
  18 {πT–1} to minimize its loss function, without any regard for the budget constraint (A-1).     
 
A.2.1    The normal case (Case N) 
  First, we consider a situation that confidence crisis does not occur.    Under this 
situation, the government can newly issue an one-period bond (bT–1,T).  The fiscal and 
monetary authorities minimize their loss functions.  Thus the authorities in period T– 
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2] + βSVT
aN     (A-4) 
where a = F, M.  VT
aN denotes the value of loss function in the normal case in the final 
period.  VT
FN is defined as (A-3), and VT
MN is obtained by assigning (A-2) to (7). 
  The monetary authority minimizes (A-4) regardless of the government budget 
constraint, taking policies selected by the fiscal authority and inflation expectation as 
given.  From the first order condition for the choice of {πT–1}, we obtain the following 
condition 
  v(x ~ – xT–1) = απMπT–1       (A-5-1) 
  The fiscal authority minimizes its loss function and sets policies to satisfy the 
following conditions: 
  v(x ~ – xT–1) = αgS(g ~ –gT–1) = βN
*[K
~
+ bT]     (A-5-2) 
  From the above conditions (A-5-1,2) and the government budget constraint, the 
following relations are held under the rational expectations formation of the private 
sector (π
e
T–1 = πT–1) 
  bT–1,T = δT–1[K
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+ bT–1 – βN
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A.2.2    The case of default in the final period under confidence crisis (Case C) 
  Next, we consider a situation that confidence crisis occurs.  Under this 
situation, the government cannot newly issue any bond (bT–1,T = 0).  The fiscal and 
monetary authorities minimize their loss functions in consideration of situation in the 
final period; whether the government faces a debt default or not in the final period.     
  At first, we consider the case that default occurs in the final period.    When the 
government  does declare a debt default in the final period, the government budget 
constraint in the final period becomes (A-1) with z ≠ 0.    Under this situation, we obtain 
  19 the following conditions from the first order conditions for the choice of {πT, τT, gT}, taking 
policies decided by the other authority and inflation expectation as given, 
  vz(x ~ – xT) = αgS( g ~ –gT) = απMπT      (A-8) 
Moreover, from the above conditions (1’) and (12), and the government budget 
constraint (A-8) and the restriction generated by the rational expectations formation of 
the private sector (πeT = πT), the following relations are held 
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  Next we investigate policy choice in period T– 1.    The authorities in period T– 
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where a = F, M. The monetary authority minimizes (A-11) regardless of the government 
budget constraint, taking policies selected by the fiscal authority and inflation 
expectation as given.    Since this situation is the same as Case C, condition with respect 
to {πT–1} in this case is (A-5-1). 
  The fiscal authority minimizes its loss functions in consideration of situation in 
the final period.    The government decides policies to satisfy the condition, 
  v(x ~ – xT-1) = αgS(g ~ –gT-1)       (A-5-2’) 
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A.2.3    The case of default in period T– 1 under confidence crisis (Case D) 
  Also, we discuss the situation that the government in period T–1 triggers a 
debt default under confidence crisis.  Under this situation, the government cannot 
newly issue an one-period bond (b  = 0).  T–1,T
  The fiscal and monetary authorities minimize their loss functions in 
consideration of situation in the final period.  If once the government defaults on 
payments in period T– 1, however, the government has no debt in the final period, that 
is, there is no default in the final period.   Thus the authorities in period T– 1 have the 
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where a = F, M.    The government budget constraint in this period is (A-1) with z ≠ 1. 
  The monetary authority minimizes (A-13) regardless of the government budget 
constraint, taking policies selected by the fiscal authority and inflation expectation as 
given.  From the first order condition for the choice of {πT–1}, we obtain the following 
condition 
  vz(x ~ – xT–1) = απMπ T–1       ( A - 1 4 - 1 )  
  The fiscal authority minimizes its loss function (A-13), subject to (A-1). The 
authority sets policies to satisfy the following condition: 
  20   vz(x ~ – xT–1) = αgS( g ~ – gT–1)       ( A - 1 4 - 2 )  
  From the above conditions (1’), (A-14-1, 2), and the government budget 
constraint (A-1), the following relations are held under the rational expectations 
formation of the private sector (π
e
T–1 = πT–1) 
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A.2.4  Welfare  comparison  between Case C and Case D 
  Dose the fiscal authority trigger a debt default under no confidence crisis?  It 
depends on the value of the loss function of the fiscal authority in each case. 
 If  VT–1
FD ≥ VT–1
FC, the government does not trigger a default in period T– 1.    On 
the other hand, in the case of V2
FD < V2
FC, the fiscal authority has incentives to default 
on payments in period T– 1. 











FC is satisfied under the following conditions 
  bT–1 > K D K S S
~
) 1 (
~ 2 − − + β β ,      (A-17) 
These conditions suggest that the government has an incentive to default when the 
amount of debt outstanding is more than a certain level. 
 
A.2.5  Welfare  comparison between Case N and Case C or Case D 
  Whether the confidence crisis occurs or not in period T– 1 depends on welfare 
loss of the fiscal authority in each case.  If the government defaults on payments, 
investors of the government bonds face losses.  Thus, they do not buy the bonds at all 
when they expect that the government trigger a debt default in period T– 1 or the final 
period. 
 If  VT–1
FN ≤ min{VT–1
FC, VT–1
FD}, the fiscal authority does not have any incentives 
to default in each period.  Hence, investors can purchase the government bonds.  We 




FD is satisfied, under the following conditions 
  0 < bN,T–1 < βSD –K




2 – 1},     (A-18) 
where  γT–1  ≡  δ T –1
2{(βN*)
2 + βS},  bN,T–1  ≡ ( γT–1 – 1)bT–1
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a n d           ( A - 1 7 ’ )  
















β D S  
  On the other hand, VT–1
FN < VT–1
FD < V T–1
FC is satisfied under (A-17) and the 
following conditions 
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FN  ≤ min{VT–1
FC, VT–1
FD}, that is, conditions (A-17’)and (A-18) or (A-17) and 
(A-19) are held, investors buy the government bonds in period T– 1.  It means that 
there is no confidence crisis in period T– 1 under this situation.  Otherwise, investors 
do not buy bonds at all in period T– 1.    Thus confidence crisis occurs in period T– 1. 
 
 
A.3    Policy choice in period t 
  In general, in period t, investors of the government bonds firstly expect 
whether the government trigger a debt default in subsequent periods.  If they believe 
the default occurs, they do not buy the bonds at all.    This situation is confidence crisis.   
Under this situation, the government cannot newly issue bonds.  If investors expect 
the default does not occur, the government bonds are freely treaded. 
  After that, the fiscal authority chooses {τt, gt, bts} to minimize its loss function, 
subject to the budget constraint (A-1).  Also the monetary authority chooses {πt} to 
minimize its loss function, without any regard for the budget constraint (A-1).  The 
structure of this policy game from period T– 2 to period T, for example, is shown in 
Figure A. 
 
**** Insert Figure A **** 
 
A.3.1    The normal case (Case N) 
  First, we consider a situation that confidence crisis does not occur.    Under this 
situation, the government can newly issue bonds.    The fiscal and monetary authorities 






2 + (xt –x ~ )
2 + αgS(gt –g ~ )
2] + βSVt+1
aN     (A-4’) 
where a = F, M. Vt+1
aN denotes the value of loss function in the normal case in the final 
period.  From the first order conditions like (A-6), the value of the loss function of the 
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A.3.2    The case of default under confidence crisis 
  Next, we consider a situation that confidence crisis occurs in period t.  Under 
this situation, the government cannot newly issue any bond in this and subsequent 
periods.    If the government triggers debt default in period t, we also obtain the value of 
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V ρ γ , 
from the first order conditions like (A-14-1, 2).    Likewise, if the government defaults in 
period t+j (0 ≤ j ≤ T– t), from the first order conditions like (A-5-1), (A-5-2’) and (A-9), the 


















































































F b K K
N
N
ρ β ρ γ β  
We define Vt
FD ≡ min{Vt,j
FD|0 ≤ j ≤ T– t}. 
 Hence,  if  Vt
FN ≤ Vt
FD, the fiscal authority does not have any incentives to default 
in period t.  We numerically examine a realistic case based on the above setting in 
Section 4.4. 
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The general account of the central government 
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Figure 2 
 
Central and local governments 
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Figure 3 
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  26 Figure 4 
Result of Numerical Analysis in the Second Best Case 
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  27 Figure 5 
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V1FD  V1FN 
V2F|b1=0  V2F 
If V1FN ≤ V1FD  If V1FN > V1FD 
 
NC: non confidence crisis, C: confidence crisis, D: default, ND: non default, P: policy 
choice 
F: fiscal authority, M: monetary authority, I: investors 
 
  28 Figure 6 
Result of Numerical Analysis in a Realistic Case 
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t = T– 1 
t = T 
NC: non confidence crisis, C: confidence crisis, D: default, ND: non default, P: policy choice 
F: fiscal authority, M: monetary authority, I: investors 
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Japanese Government Bonds 












(b) - (a) 
30-year Bonds  1,600.0  2,000.0 400.0 
20-year Bonds  4,800.0  6,900.0 2,100.0 
15-year Bonds  5,500.0  6,000.0 500.0 
10-year Bonds  22,800.0  22,800.0 - 
5-year Bonds  22,800.0  22,900.0 100.0 
2-year Bonds  20,960.0  19,250.5 -1,709.5 
Treasury Bills  34,170.9  34,170.9 - 
Inflation-Indexed Bonds  100.0  600.0 500.0 
Total Amount in The Market  112,730.9  114,621.4  1,890.5 
(excluding Treasury Bills)  (78,560.0)  (80,450.5)  (1,890.5) 
Postal Savings  2,100.0  2,300.0 200.0 
Bank of Japan  6,441.9  13,219.3 6,777.4 
Fiscal Loan Fund  400.0  1,000.0 600.0 
Fiscal Loan Fund Special Account Bonds 
(transitional measures)  18,550.0  29,600.0 11,050.0 
Postal Savings  9,960.0  19,700.0 9,740.0 
Pension Reserves  5,650.0  7,500.0 1,850.0 
Postal Life Insurance  2,940.0  2,400.0 -540.0 
Total Amount in Public Sector  27,491.9  46,119.3  18,627.4 
JGB for Individual Investors  1,200.0  1,600.0 400.0 
TOTAL  141,422.8  162,340.7  20,917.9 
 
Note 
1: Figures may not sum up to the total because of rounding.     
2: The amount of buy-backs will be approximately 1,000.0 billion yen in FY2003, and 
approximately 2,000.0 billion yen in FY2004.     
3: Figure in "Bank of Japan" in "Planned Issuance for FY2004 Initial Budget" includes 
400.0 billion yen of refunding bonds to be issued for the same amount of buy-backs from 
the Bank of Japan.   
4: Figure in "Fiscal Loan Fund" indicates refunding bonds to be issued for the same 
amount of buy-backs from the Fiscal Loan Fund.  At the Fiscal Loan Fund Special 
Account, funds for the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program are managed. 
5: 20-year bonds issuance in FY2003 will be increased by 600.0 billion yen, to meet 
requests from market participants, which will be transferred within refunding bonds (ie. 
  31 2-year bonds issuance will be reduced by the same amount.).   
6: The issue amount of JGB for Individual Investors in FY2003 will exceed its initially 
planned amount (1,200.0 billion yen in "Planned Issuance for FY2003 Initial Budget").   
7: For New Financial Resource Bonds in the FY2003 Supplementary Budget, the 
Construction Bonds issuance will be increased by 273.0 billion yen and the Special 
Deficit-Financing Bonds issuance will be reduced by 273.0 billion yen from its initially 
planned amount shown in "Planned Issuance for FY2003 Initial Budget". 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance “Planned Bond Issuance for FY 2004” 
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Maturity Structure of JGBs in Fiscal 2003 
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Endnote 
1 Broda and Weinstein (2005) point out that using gross debt levels to assess Japan’s 
fiscal sustainability is equivalent to treating Japan’s financial assets as worthless.  
They assert, therefore, that net debt levels are more appropriate to assess the fiscal 
sustainability than gross debt.  However, there seem to be following aspects to be 
considered. 
Firstly, Broda and Weinstein (2005) calculate the value of net debt of the 
Japanese public sector by summing together the net debts of the Japanese government, 
postal savings, and government financial institutions.  Though this net debt of the 
Japanese public sector includes net debt of social security, the assets of social security 
accounts are earmarked for the future pension benefit payouts.    Therefore, it is better, 
from this aspect, to exclude net debt of social security to assess the fiscal sustainability. 
  Secondly, if fiscal authority and monetary authority act non-cooperatively, 
fiscal authority has to take into account the possibility that the monetary authority sell 
government bonds independently.    Therefore, it is important for the independent fiscal 
authority to assess the fiscal sustainability without taking account of the government 
bonds held by the monetary authority.  Our analysis mainly deals with a 
non-cooperative case so that we focus our attention on gross debt levels. 
2 The Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP) has been called “the second budget” 
because the government initially used FILP to undertake projects it was unable to 
include in the general account budget.  Doi and Hoshi (2003) have a good summary of 
the structure, components, and history of FILP and PSS, and provide estimates of the 
costs FILP has and might impose on Japanese taxpayers; its appendix provides a 
further review of the literature.    Also see Cargill and Yoshino (2000, 2003). 
3 An economy in Japan is now mired in a liquidity trap.  We would like to focus on the 
situation where an economy in Japan escapes from a liquidity trap. 
4 The reason why we set a 200-period model is to weaken effects of the terminal 
conditions which all stock variables are zero, on this numerical analysis. 
5 The real interest rate is assumed to be equal to the world interest rate.  In addition, 
we exclude the possibility of partial default by assumption.  If, therefore, investors 
expect the default, the interest rate on the government bonds becomes infinity. 
6 As we mentioned above, the government may default only in the first period, not in the 
second period. 
7 Since this strategic issuance of government bonds distorts the resource allocation form 
the ex ante point of view, it is considered to be one of the time inconsistency problems. 
8 One of the reasons why Japan has accumulated the debt drastically is related to the 
political situation of Japan in the 1990s.    Especially after 1993, several parties formed 
a coalition government.  This instability of government party in the Diet resulted in 
the delay of fiscal structural reform toward fiscal reconstruction because the politicians 
have to take into account the possibility of dropping power when carrying out such 
polices. 
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